Emotion Regulation by Emotional Entrepreneurs:

Implications for Political Science and International Relations

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ABSTRACT

Despite robust evidence that emotions can have a powerful impact on public opinion, political behavior, and foreign policy, few studies have directly addressed the possibility that emotions may be strategically regulated by political and policy actors. To systematically examine the role of emotion regulation in domestic and global political domains, what is needed is a framework for organizing the large number of regulatory strategies available to actors who wish to influence others' emotions in pursuit of their goals. One such framework is Gross's (2014) process model of emotion regulation, which previously has been used primarily to examine psychological processes at the individual level in healthy and clinical populations. We use this framework to present an overview of the emerging field of emotion regulation by emotional entrepreneurs at the local, state, national and global levels, to identify gaps in the relevant literatures in political science and international relations, and to propose a research agenda which revolves around whether different emotion regulation strategies and implementation tactics have different political consequences, both immediately and over the long term.

Keywords: Emotion Regulation, Emotional Entrepreneurs, Opinion Formation, Political Behavior, Social Movements, Public Policy

Politicians and policymakers are successful to the extent that they can influence others' views, decisions, and behaviors. One way to exercise this kind of influence is by modifying others' emotions – the temporally extended appraisal-based processes such as anger, fear, and hope that involve loosely coordinated changes across experiential, behavioral, and physiological response systems (Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005). This is because emotions affect opinion formation, attention, learning, and political behavior (for reviews, see Brader, Marcus, & Miller, 2011; Brader & Marcus, 2013; Groenendyk, 2011), as well as attitudes on a wide range of issues related to world politics, such as nuclear proliferation, the logic of deterrence, the war on terror, motives for war, alliances and defense policies, ethnic conflicts, and humanitarian intervention (for a review, see Hutchinson & Bleiker, 2014; Mintz & DeRouen, 2010).

Recently, scholars have begun to consider the strategies employed by politicians to modify peoples' emotions. Focusing largely on the competitive information environment of electoral campaigns, scholars have noticed that different approaches to influencing emotions have different consequences (e.g., Brader, 2005, 2006; Ridout & Franz, 2011).[1] These studies have yielded important insights, and what is now needed is a framework for examining how politicians and policymakers regulate others' emotions.

In this article, we integrate psychological research on emotion regulation, a young and rapidly developing field (Gross, 2010, 2014), with the study of politics at the intersection between political and policy leaders, on the one hand, and the general public, on the other. As we discuss in greater detail below, *emotion regulation* refers to attempts to influence which emotions people have, when they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions (Gross, 1998a, 275). This process is driven by *emotional*

entrepreneurs[2] – individual and collective actors that attempt to advance a political and/or policy agenda by regulating expected or actual emotions generated during political and policy processes.

To understand emotion regulation in political and policy contexts – and, in particular – the causes and consequences of the operation of emotional entrepreneurs, we extend the study of emotion regulation, which has previously focused primarily on psychological processes at the individual level, to the level of the political system and the level of world politics. Focusing on individual and institutional political actors, our goal is to provide an overarching conceptual framework delineating the major families of processes that populate this emerging area.

Such a framework would enable us to understand the processes by which politicians and the policies they design may become valued or devalued for reasons unrelated to their ability to affect goals (Edelman, 1964, 1988; Jones, Thomas, & Wolfe, 2014; Maor, 2014). The development of a conceptual framework that maps this dynamic process would nicely complement William Riker's (1986) seminal contribution regarding political manipulation by agenda control, strategic voting, and manipulation of dimensions which is concerned with cognitive rather than emotional processes. Such a framework would also help us to further expand and develop the most prevalent theoretical approach in political science – the theory of affective intelligence (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus, 1988).

When discussing emotion regulation, an important distinction need to be made. One must ask whose emotions are being regulated, and by whom? In particular, the emotion regulation goal may be activated in oneself (*intrinsic regulation*) or in someone

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else (*extrinsic regulation*). For our purposes here, our main focus will be extrinsic regulation. Illuminating in this regard is the distinction between short-term hedonic goals and "instrumental" motives for emotion regulation which are perceived to lead to longer-term benefits (e.g., Tamir, 2009; Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008). For our purposes here, our main focus will be on instrumental goals which are perceived to lead to short- and/or long-term benefits for emotional entrepreneurs.

This article proceeds as follows. The first section elaborates on why politicians and policy makers might want to regulate others' emotions. The second section describes the process model of emotion regulation. The third section maps the literature using the process model of emotion regulation. The fourth section describes open questions and puzzles as well as promising possibilities for future research in political science and international relations. The final section offers a concluding comment.

WHY DO POLITICIANS AND POLICYMAKERS REGULATE EMOTIONS?

Many politicians and policymakers are strategic actors. They know that emotions can affect opinions and behavior, and are therefore motivated to win the competition in the emotional arena. This is essentially a competition over the power to regulate one or more of three types of expressions of emotions, elicited by political candidates, political groups, public policies, politically-relevant events, and even specific objects or symbols in the political system and in world politics: *individual* emotions, *group-based* emotions that derive from the emotional experiences of an individual in response to group-related events (e.g., Smith, 1993; Goldenberg, Halperin, van Zomeren, & Gross, in press; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Iyer & Leach, 2008),[3] and *collective* emotions that arise when the society as a whole, or its part thereof, experience the emotions (e.g., Niedenthal

& Brauer, 2012; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). The "prize" of successful emotion regulation strategies is increasing popularity of politicians and public policies, winning in political and policy contests, and the like. We term the actors that employ these strategies "emotional entrepreneurs."

Emotional entrepreneurs recognize and take advantage of emotional opportunities at the domestic and global levels to deliver significant political and policy value, often in a shorter period of time and in the face of a risk of backlash. Their activities, which may involve enterprise in the sense of some form of emotion-generating venture (e.g., military operation, Olympic Games), elicit the dynamics that are responsible for changes in the magnitude, duration, and/or quality of emotional responses of the target audience/s (Gross, Sheppes, & Urry, 2011; Gross, 2014). The more innovative emotional entrepreneurs are, the less aware the target audience is of the fact that it is being emotionally manipulated. If we are to gauge the full spectrum of those who participate in political and policy processes, how, and with what impact, we should theorize more rigorously about these actors.

The power to regulate emotions in the political system includes quantitative as well as qualitative dimensions. The former refers to attempts to increase (up-regulate) or decrease (down-regulate) a particular emotion, such as fear or anger; the latter, to attempts at changing the type of emotion (e.g., anxiety into anger). Politicians and policymakers regulate emotions in order to influence perceptions, preferences, and vote choices, as well as to exercise public authority to achieve substantive ends. The goal of affecting political and policy contestations may be short-term changes in the aforementioned attributes, as well as durable shifts caused by reconfiguration of emotions

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and emotional experiences. For this reason, emotion regulation in political and policy environments features a distinct set of players, strategies, and dynamics.

Overall, emotion regulation profoundly changes the contours of political and public policy contests and therefore creates politics and policies. It advantages the set of political actors who recognize the potential role of emotion regulation, alongside the role of institutional and agenda manipulation, and who master the use of tools and strategies employed throughout this process. It disadvantages politicians whose attempts to regulate emotion backfire, for example, when people who value autonomy feel they are being manipulated and this, in turn, provokes a reaction which undermines the aims of those who are perceived by the public as the manipulators.

THE PROCESS MODEL OF EMOTION REGULATION

In what follows we offer a conceptual framework that highlights a psychological perspective on the ways emotion regulation happens during political and policy processes. It draws upon Gross's (1998a) *process model of emotion regulation*, which helps to organize the numerous forms of emotion regulation at the individual level. The framework advanced here specifies five stages which represent five families of emotion regulation processes, namely, situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation. These families may be distinguished according to when in the emotion-generative process they have their main impact (Gross, 2014; see Figure 1). For each family we present a brief example in order to provides scholars with a very basic understanding of the topic discussed. Numerous examples are provided in the next section.

[Figure 1 about here]

Situation selection consists of efforts by emotional entrepreneurs to modify the political or policy situation members of the public and/or policymakers encounter in order to increase or decrease the likelihood that certain emotions will arise. This family of emotion regulation strategies is best captured in the attempts by emotional entrepreneurs to influence the decision of these individuals to either *approach* or *avoid* an encounter with the political candidate's personality traits, principles, and policy positions, or the policy goals, policy tools, or target populations, by hiding them from sight or masking them. Because this strategy occurs before individuals enter into an emotional situation, it is the most forward-looking attempt at emotion regulation. An example is when political and policy actors in government significantly limit public access to emotionally evocative sites, people, and information which may lead to political behavior which undermine the interests of these actors. Another example revolves around staging strategies, such as a speech by a political candidate at a battleship with the national flag on his right side.

Situation modification refers to efforts emotional entrepreneurs make to modify the external features of the political or policy situation in order to alter its emotional impact. So even if one approaches the political candidate or policy, the emotional information may be regulated by changing certain characteristics of the external political or policy situation. An example is the timing of the business cycle by Republican presidents so that economic growth is produced just before elections for which voters, whose "feel-good" factor outweigh their concerns about rising inequality following GOP presidents' policies, reward them (Bartel, 2008).

Attentional deployment refers to attempts by emotional entrepreneurs to change the direction of attention towards a political candidate or policy after the emotional

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situation has been encountered in order to change their emotional impact. This activity is undertaken primarily by cognitive means, especially distraction. *Distraction* refers to efforts by emotional entrepreneurs to direct attention away from the emotional aspects of a political candidate's personality traits, principles and policy positions, or policy goals, policy tools, and target populations, mainly by producing independent neutral thought content (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007). An example of the use of distraction in order to reduce public anger is the decision by Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu to release Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in exchange for 1,027 Hamas terrorists in the midst of the social unrest amongst Israel's middle class. Another example, by same prime minister, is the decision to bring the world's largest fire-fighting aircraft, the "Evergreen" Boeing 747 supertanker from the U.S., when Israel's worst ever forest fire was already waning.

Cognitive change consists of efforts by emotional entrepreneurs to change the meaning of a political candidate's personality traits, principles, and policy positions, or policy goals, policy tools, and target populations, in a way that alters their emotional impact. They do so by changing how members of the general public or policymakers make sense of these political or policy features and of their capacity to manage them. The most studied form of cognitive change is *reappraisal,* which involves an attempt to change the meaning of an event in order to influence emotional responses to an event (Gross, 2001, 2002; Gross & Thompson, 2007; van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012). An example of cognitive change is the attempts of U.S. Senator James Inhofe (Oklahoma) to frame climate change as a hoax, using rhetoric "that was often visceral, hyperbolic, and shrill […]" (Cox & Béland, 2013, 318). This strategy "encouraged people

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to make reflexive judgments, filter out conflicting information, and thereby foreclose careful thought about the relations between scientific knowledge and policy outcomes" (Cox & Béland, 2013, 318).

Response modulation refers to changing one or more of the experiential, behavioral, or physiological components of the activated emotion response towards a political candidate's personality traits, principles and policy positions, or policy goals, policy tools, and target populations, in the final stage of the emotion generating process in order to change its emotional impact. One form of response modulation is expressive suppression (e.g., Richards & Gross, 1999, 2000), which refers to efforts to suppress emotional behavior. An example is the dismantling by the Hong Kong Police of the "Occupy Central" protest site in Hong Kong, bringing to an end almost three months of intense, pro-democracy demonstration.

The process model of emotion regulation provides an overarching framework for analyzing the actions of emotional entrepreneurs. The different stages in the model represent a cycle of stages that is activated repeatedly during an emotion. For example, a fear response to a political candidate, generated by a smear campaign operated by a rival candidate, may lead one to quickly withdraw one's support from the candidate and then subsequently look for another candidate to support. The individual's "emotional response" contains all these different responses, perceptions, and actions. However, they are represented in the model with a few cycles of the situation-attention-appraisal-response sequence, each of which may successively influence the situation that gave rise to the emotion in the first place (as indicated by the feedback arrow in Figure 1).

MAPPPING THE LITERATURE USING THE PROCESS MODEL OF
EMOTION REGULATION

In the following sub-sections, we draw attention to the three major families of emotion regulation processes that have been explored to date in the political arena. Studies that are placed within each of these groups provide detailed examples of emotion regulation in the isolated world of the lab and in real-world settings. Each study shows how emotion regulation is employed, what the effects of emotion regulation strategies (i.e., changed emotions and, consequently, changed attitudes and/or behavior) are, and how these effects are measured. This, in turn, emphasizes our claim that applying the process model for understanding emotion regulation strategies by political and policy actors is the direction that scholarship might most profitably take.

Situation Selection

Most research on emotion regulation in political settings (often explicitly termed emotion manipulation) focuses on *situation selection*. This strategy often revolves around increasing exposure to emotional appeals in order to evoke a particular emotion in the target audience (Kaid & Johnston, 1991, 56).

Focusing on the tone of election campaigns, communication scholars have explored multiple forms of emotional appeal (Marmor-Lavie & Weimann, 2005) and claimed that spot viewing influences perceptions and judgments of candidate likeability (for a review, see Kaid, 2004; Kaid & Chanslor, 2004), that the best medium for emotion initiation is television (Way & Masters, 1996), that there is a reliance on emotional appeals in both negative and positive ads (Kaid & Johnston, 1991), that the most popular strategy in negative ads appears to be humor or ridicule (Kaid & Johnaton, 1991), that

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the use of emotional appeals undermines rational and issue-based voting and therefore reduces the quality of voter decision making (Goren, 1997; Marmor-Lavie & Weimann, 2005) and undermines the values inherent in liberal democracy (Dermody & Scullion, 2003), and that emotion-related brain systems are relatively more active when partisans are presented with politically threatening information. (Westen, Kilts, Blagov, Harenski, & Hamann, 2006).

Political science scholars have demonstrated that voters behave differently in different emotional states (e.g., Marcus, 2000), that leaders' expressive displays affect public attitudes (Sullivan & Masters, 1988; McHugo et al. 1985; ; Masters & Sullivan 1989), that fear-arousing rhetoric may be selectively deployed to support political purposes (De Castella, McGarty, & Musgrove, 2009; De Castella & McGarty, 2011; see also: Burkitt, 2005; Jeritt, 2004; Weber, 2012), that politicians will have greater ability to use fear for their purposes when a citizenry's psychological profile makes it less motivated or able to adapt to fear appeals (Lupia & Menning, 2009), that political ads in the 2000 U.S. presidential campaign elicited five emotions, namely, anger, fear, enthusiasm, pride and compassion (Brader, 2006), that political ads using non-verbal emotional cues to evoke emotions (particularly enthusiasm and fear) can change the way citizens get involved and therefore can promote democratically desirable behavior (Brader, 2005), and that leaders and citizen groups in the U.S. manipulate emotions to polarize the electorate (McDermott, 2011).

In addition, Ridout and Franz (2011) have demonstrated that televised ads influence people's voting choice, with greater influence on those who are the least informed about politics, and that tone and emotional appeals are not the same; hence,

anger appeal can be found in both negative and positive ads. They have also found an inconsistent pattern of results with regard to the impact of fear and anger ads – sometimes they benefit their sponsors and sometimes they are ineffective (see also Calantone & Warshaw, 1985; LaTour & Pitts, 1989, Mueller, 2006; Torres, Hyman, & Hamilton 2012), and a consistent pattern regarding promotional ads and appeals to enthusiasm – they never result in a backlash. Ridout and Franz (2011) concluded, as did Lau, Sigelman and Rovner (2007), that we do not know whether negative ads "work". The core message is that, compared to no regulation, situation selection in campaign advertising leads to greater or lesser liking of political candidates by the general public, voting for political candidates, participation in politics, vigilance in political interactions, reliance on contemporary evaluation, persuasion and activation of existing loyalties (e.g., Brader, 2005, 2006).

Relatedly, scholars of social movements have shown that situation selection is undertaken by the strategic use of threats and blame (Jasper, 1997, 2006a, b; Jasper & Poulsen, 1995). Threats are intended to produce negative emotions such as anger and outrage, and blame is intended to suggest targets against which these emotions could generate injustice frames (see also Vanderford, 1989). And scholars of international relations have embraced the manipulation of fear in the study of conflict processes. For example, the politics of fear has been addressed by numerous scholars of post-conflict societies, divided by the pain of past or current injustices and by emotions derived from traumatic events (Ahmed, 2004; Brown, 1995; Butler, 2004; Holes, 2004). The phenomenon of interest in these studies has been the extension of fear to broader social relations, that is, to society at large. In addition, Petersen (2011) has developed an

analytical framework to explain variations in Western intervention in the Balkans by the strategic use of emotions by political and policy actors.

Relatedly, Ross (2014) has argued that, as a "circulation of affect" in the context of social interaction accumulates over time, social actors are exposed to new combinations of emotions and, consequently, emotions are decoupled from their original objects and become attached to new objects and meanings. And Zahariadis (2003, 2005) has demonstrated that foreign policy actors – in this case, Greek politicians who responded to the breakup of the Yugoslav federation – used political symbols to generate emotions and convey the meaning of policy images.

Cognitive Change

Cognitive change is most commonly used to decrease negative emotion. An attempt to directly negate fear appeals or reduce negative emotion may also be on the strategic menu of emotional entrepreneurs. The aim is to negate or reduce the effects of provocative messages, conveying direct threats that are derived from a "dangerous" candidate in order to turn voters away from him or her. Calantone and Warshaw (1985) focused on two negation strategies, namely, denying the validity of fear-inducing charges and counterattacking the opponent who raised this association. They found that fear-inducing charges by a credible source reduced the attacked candidate's vote, but this effect was fully offset when a second credible source denied that the charges were valid or levied a counterattack. When both negation strategies are simultaneously employed, the attacked candidate's vote increased above its pre-attack level.

Cognitive change has also received attention by scholars of social movements. For example, Gamson (1992) claims that for protest behavior to emerge, an "injustice

frame" should be activated. Such frames comprise ideas and symbols that allow members and activists to construct their grievances through a sense of moral indignation. This process involves cognitive change which provides evaluations about how significant a specific problem is, what a fair solution of this problem is, and how the problem could be alleviated or resolved by social movement activities. Emotion regulation plays a key role in this process because such frames depend on "the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul" (Gamson, 1992, 32). A successful up-regulation of anger may lead to increased willingness of activists to challenge whatever perceived harm or suffering they have encountered. Goodwin and Pfaff (2001) demonstrated that civil rights activists in the United States and East Germany used mass gatherings, rituals, shaming, new collective identities and the possession of guns in order to reduce participants' fears. Gun possession, for example, could modify one's appraisal of a situation in order to alter its emotional impact.

Another context in which cognitive change has received attention is in studies of intractable conflicts (e.g., Halperin, 2014; Halperin, Sharvit, & Gross, 2011). Israelis who regulated their negative emotions using cognitive change were more supportive of providing humanitarian aid than Israelis who did not use cognitive change (Halperin & Gross, 2011). A second study from this same research group randomized Israeli participants either to a cognitive change training condition or to a control condition just before the Palestinian UN bid in 2011. One week after the training, participants who had been trained to use cognitive change showed greater support for conciliatory policies and less support for aggressive policies towards Palestinians than control participants. These effects were still evident five months later, and at each time point, negative emotion

mediated the effects of cognitive change on conflict-related attitudes (Halperin, Porat, Tamir, & Gross, 2013). Studies of cognitive change have also addressed intractable conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina (e.g., Čehajić-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Gross, 2011), Cyprus (e.g., Halperin, Husnu, Trzesniewski, Dweck, & Gross, 2012), Northern Ireland (Moeschberger, Dixon, Niens, & Carins, 2005) and other contexts.

Response Modulation

Response modulation is most commonly used to teach new rules of emotion expression. Goodwin and Pfaff (2001) have demonstrated that U.S. civil rights activists engaged in "emotion work" aimed at creating (or suppressing) various emotions, fear included. Emotional work is undertaken, amongst others, by rhetoric (Robnett, 1997), day-to-day interaction with the target audience in order to build emotional loyalty necessary for persuasion (Lofland, 1996), socialization, i.e., teaching new emotion rules (Hochschild, 1979) which make the expression of certain emotions, such as anger, acceptable (Taylor and Whittier 1995), and the creation of institutions that promote and legitimize the expression of emotions (Morgen, 1995). Making a particular emotion acceptable may trigger a process by which activists or would-be activists recognize that the collective fails to experience the emotions that are appropriate for the event, and consequently, they take on the burden of feeling that emotion (Goldenberg, Saguy, & Halperin, 2014). This process of emotional burden, which may explain collective action, compliments models in which emotions are considered as a motivational source for collective action (e.g., Van Zomeren et al. 2008). Relatedly, making a particular emotion acceptable may also impact the communication of an emotional entrepreneur's thoughts

and intentions because emotions serve a very important functional role in these processes (e.g., Le Bon, 1960/1895; Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef, Carsten, & Manstead, 2010).

Altering emotional responses once they have been elicited by emotional socialization (Aminzade & McAdam, 2001, 39) is also undertaken by addressing the "social epistemologies of emotion" (Thoits, 1989), that is, the beliefs regarding different aspects of emotions (e.g., who is likely to experience what kinds of emotions, the dynamics of emotional contagion, and so on). Gould (2009) has nicely described the historical process of emotion work in gay and lesbian movements which has changed how they feel about themselves and others, and how emotions should be interpreted and expressed.

OPEN QUESTIONS AND PUZZLES

In reviewing the relevant literature, we have pointed to additional work needed on situation selection, cognitive change, and response modulation, and we have identified the pressing need for work on situation modification and attentional deployment in political contexts. Ongoing opportunities exist in virtually every area of inquiry into emotion regulation. For example, scholars may examine the efficacy of the following attentional deployment strategies: (i) distraction; (ii) thought suppression, which involves efforts not to think about a certain emotional content (e.g., Wegner, 1994); (iii) rumination, which involves attempts to ask "big questions" (Why are we sad? Why do these bad things happen to us?) regarding negative events, in order to direct attention inward with an abstract, rather than action, orientation (e.g., Watkins, 2008), and (iv) mindfulness, which involves effort at directing attention to the immediate here and now

aspects with an orientation of acceptance (Bishop, Lau, Shapiro, Carlson, Anderson, Carmody, & et al. 2004).

Scholars may also rely on the premise that emotion regulation strategies may be employed before the emotion has had an impact on attitudes and behavior of individuals, or afterwards. They may hypothesize that emotion regulation strategies that have their maximum impact before the process of emotion generation has had a full impact on the individual's attitudes and behavior (i.e., situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment and cognitive change) are generally more effective than strategies that start later in this process, when the individual's response is well-developed (e.g., response modulation) (Gross, 1998b). They may also hypothesize that the relative costs of strategies that intervene earlier will be lower than those that intervene later on, and thus have to deal with the fully developed consequences of emotion generation. Scholars could also evaluate the effectiveness of emotion regulation strategies employed by political and policy actors under different emotion strengths, different emotions, different groups of emotions, and varying emotion intensity.

Furthermore, some strategies may be effective in the short run, while others may be more productive in the long-run. Scholars might therefore test a claim that the strategy of distraction is likely to be effective in the short term, but its regulatory consequences will tend to evaporate quickly. By contrast, employing emotion regulation strategies late in the emotion-generative process, which is likely to involve relatively high emotional intensity, may be costly to activate yet may produce long-term benefits. This research agenda of emotional regulation effectiveness could also be widened to include individual

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differences (e.g., gender), group differences (e.g., hegemonic vs. subservient), as well as cultural and geographic ones.

Relatedly, scholars may also examine the role of time in designing studies, and consider, for example, how and why political and policy actors employ specific strategies in particular time periods, why emotion regulation strategies change and evolve over time, how changes in the time horizons of these actors influence their emotion regulation strategies, and how different macro-social factors influence these actors and their effects in different historical periods.

Given that emotion regulation can affect the public demand for more or less policy, scholars might wish to demonstrate how emotion regulation operates at a number of different stages in the policymaking process. Specifically, public policies are frequently infused with value, emotion, safety and cost-benefit concerns (e.g., wastefulness) as well as other symbolic or ideational elements (Schneider, Ingram, & DeLeon 2014). This implies that a public policy may occasionally be over- or undervalued, and, if self-reinforcing processes enter into the fray over an extended period of time, they may trigger the emergence of a policy bubble (Jones, Thomas, & Wolfe 2014; Maor 2014). Scholars may analyze the role of emotional entrepreneurs in up- or down regulating emotions towards public policies.

Our framework could also be used to further the most prevalent theoretical approach in political science – the theory of affective intelligence (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus, 1988) – with its now widely adopted three-dimensional structural account of affective appraisals (that is, enthusiasm, anxiety and aversion/anxiety) which has generated novel hypotheses regarding dimensions of political participation; attention,

learning, reliance on contemporary considerations, and defensive and aggressive actions to protect extant identifications and convictions (e.g., Brader, 2006;MacKuen, Wolak, Keele, & Marcus, 2010). Scholars may examine emotion regulation in familiar but punishing environments as compared to other environments in order to gauge the nuanced operation of the disposition system with regard to the activation of feelings of anger and frustrations. How does emotion regulation impact the ability of the disposition system to track responses to familiar situations, and how do political and policy actors make use of these abilities? How does emotion regulation work in the case of enthusiasm and satisfaction generated by familiar and rewarding environments?

Scholars seeking to theorize about and test the role of emotions in world politics, especially the processes through which individual emotions become collective and political (Crawford, 2014; Mercer, 2014), may analyze the use of emotion regulation to "scale up" or "scale down" emotions between the individual, societal, governmental and nation-state levels. In international relations theory, the way emotions move from one level to another is still not clear (Stein, 2013, 387; Hutchison & Bleiker, 2014, 499), perhaps because it is not evident how important agency is in the explanations of emotion-driven international outcomes. Once we move away from structural explanations and identify the agency involved, we are able to explain threat perceptions by integrating emotion regulation.

Scholars should therefore pit traditional explanations of threat perception – the constructivist, the sociological institutionalist, and the psychological explanations which ignore the role of emotion in threat perception and focus instead on cognitive biases and heuristics, loss aversion, framing and risk propensity – against our explanation in order to

gauge the comparative advantages of each. An alternative way to apply our framework to higher levels of analysis is by integrating it with Sasley's (2011) framework, which is based on the understanding of states as groups that may have emotional reactions, and on the recognition that emotions generate intergroup perceptions and intergroup behavior or foreign policy in the case of states. Doing so may enable scholars to analyze the ways emotion regulation at the group level undertaken by political and policy actors triggers the desired state's reaction over issues, such as humanitarian aid.

Scholars of international politics and emotion may also build in emotion regulation as a driver for threat perception by looking at the way it is used to bolster the credibility of deterrent threats, especially its success in the emotional loading of the likelihood of a threat. Scholars may also build emotion regulation into the analysis of attempts to promote international interventions or institutionalize emotions in peace and war systems, as well as in other forms of strategic interactions. Focusing on diverse strategic contexts of foreign policy decisions, scholars may examine the deliberate production of emotions, such as empathy, in formal and informal diplomatic negotiations amongst members of security communities (Adler & Barnett, 1998), or fear, during (cold or hot) wars.

Theorizing the actual process and the specific mechanisms that render emotion political at the regional and global levels enables scholars to focus on specific emotions which are manipulated for specific purpose by specific actors using specific strategies during specific periods. Conceived in this way, one can move away from the view that emotion can explain only deviations from rationality, and towards the use of emotion to explain accurate judgments as well as erroneous ones (Mercer, 2005). This understanding

of the relations between emotion regulation, perception and decision making opens an

important research agenda for scholars of international relations and emotions. This

agenda faces "difficult but not impossible [methodological] challenges, challenges that

political psychologists have long grappled with" (Stein, 2013, 387).

CONCLUSIONS

We have used Gross's (2014) process model of emotion regulation in order to

highlight the large number of regulatory strategies available to political and policy actors

who wish to influence others' emotions. We have relied on this process model because it

has proven to be helpful in the study of emotion regulation at the individual level in

healthy and clinical populations.

In elaborating the open questions and puzzles that emerge from the application of

our framework, we have identified promising possibilities for future research which

revolve around the need to understand how emotion regulation is employed; the

underlying process that allows it to create value for emotional entrepreneurs, and how to

evaluate it more effectively. In order to get into the mind of the target, whether the

strategies are successful or not, scholars need to broaden their methodological toolbox

and develop research designs that incorporate lab experiments, the use of

electroencephalographic (EEG) techniques, functional magnetic resonance imaging

(fMRI) and other biologically oriented analyses, the use of interventions outside the lab,

such as conveying messages through the education system (e.g., Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009),

dialogue groups (e.g., Maoz, 2011), drama shows and soap operas (e.g., Paluck, 2009),

and the use of reappraisal training (or not – control group) to survey participants

(Halperin, Porat, Tamir, & Gross, 2013; Halperin, 2014). Experimental techniques as

well as agent-based modeling could generate findings and hypotheses, some of which may be examined in the real world of national and international politics, preferably by using different methods of data collection.

The emergence of this new research agenda is critical to political science and international relations because it bridges a significant gap in our understanding of the competition over control of the emotional arenas in domestic and global political domains. Although scholars of political science and international relations lack a consensus on what the most interesting questions are that require solutions, the fact that this topic is directly related to the dynamics of legitimation and valuation of politicians and public policies should suffice to place it on the research agenda.

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
Figure 1. The process model of emotion regulation (reproduced with permission from Gross, 2014).

[1] The literature on campaign advertising has examined the effect of positive versus negative advertising, discrete emotions, and the combined effect of both (e.g., Marcus, 2003; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Valentino et al. 2011; Huddy et al. 2007).

[2] McDermott (2011) defined emotional entrepreneurship as "the process by which leaders strategically use outrage at opposition members to cue in-group members to participate in action against the out-group members who have committed the outrage" (p. 114). We prefer a much broader definition whose analytical reach also captures the use of humor or sarcasm, as well as other tools.

[3] See, for example, group-based anger (e.g., Reifen Tagar, Frederico, & Halperin, 2011; Lambert, Schott & Scherer, 2011), group-based guilt and shame (e.g., Iyer & Leach, 2008), group-based pride (e.g., Haslam et al. 2000) and group-based hope (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross, 2014). According to Smith (1993) and Mackie et al. (2000), group-based emotions are influenced by the level of identification with the group, as well as by unique appraisals of the event at hand which depend on the group member's personality, values, and interests and by the type of event. Successful emotion regulation can affect both factors.