

Bureaucratic Representation in Israel*

Moshe Maor
Department of Political Science
Hebrew University

This Draft: July 2011

* This chapter was written for an edited collection entitled *The Politics of Representative Bureaucracy: Power, Legitimacy, Performance*. I am grateful to Eckhard Schroeter, Patrick von Maravic and B. Guy Peters for helpful comments. I am also very grateful to Hayah Eichler for research assistance.

Introduction

Gender and minority equity in the Israeli civil service is a unique case study. This is because Israel is the most ideological of all contemporary democracies (i.e., Zionism is the dominant ideology); social architecture is widely accepted as a government task (e.g., immigration absorption, dispersion of population and so on); government is in charge of making critical choices as it faces direct threats to the survival of the state and society, and there is a scarcity of strategic thinking. As well, Israel has a highly fragmented political system, no professional civil service elite compensating for the weakness of the political system, and political structures, processes and cultures that inhibit administrative reforms (Dror, 2002, pp. vii-x). Indeed, no comprehensive reform of the Israeli administrative system has been undertaken since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.¹ A few committees were established and reports published — the Kubersky Commission Report (Israel, 1989) being the most wide-ranging — but aside from a very few islands of excellence and professionalism, the civil service system as a whole remains fragmented, politicized, and devoid of a sense of identity, cohesiveness and *esprit de corps*.

Against this background, this chapter examines the representation of women, Israelis of Ethiopian Descent, Arab Citizens of Israel, Druze and Circassians in the Israeli governmental ministries and subsidiary units. It discusses the factors affecting the representation of these groups during the last decade, and identifies actors and practices that facilitate or prevent minority access to senior positions. Attention is focused on actual achievements and failures rather than the governments' promises and commitments. The argument advanced here is that although the issues of gender and minority equality have been firmly on the political agenda, certain groups have remained under-represented in the Israeli civil service. Specifically, despite some principles of formal equality, the higher the grade, the fewer the women and Arabs. These groups are the two most under-represented groups in the Israeli civil service. Legislation which was supposed to cater for these groups was by-passed and diffused by a combination

of organizational obstacles and personal barriers. There is therefore an urgent need for women and minority groups to be placed into positions for which they are qualified, rather than to satisfy political demands for a diverse workforce.

The Organizational Framework

Public sector organizations in Israel are divided into three categories: the governmental sector (civil service), the non-governmental sector (e.g., Office of the President, State Comptroller, Knesset Administration and the Bank of Israel), and local authorities. The governmental sector is divided into three categories, namely, governmental ministries and subsidiary units, statutory authorities and government corporations. Governmental ministries are in charge of policy formation, funding, implementation and evaluation. Each ministry is headed by a minister who is accountable to the Knesset. Due to their distinct policy areas, responsibilities, tasks and in many cases also culture, the ministries are quite distinguishable from one another. Furthermore, because hiring and promotion for senior posts are largely undertaken within each ministry, a narrower policy view in each ministry is common and loyalty of senior employees rests with the ministry rather than with the civil service system as a whole. It is therefore hardly surprising that the Israeli civil service system resembles a loose federation of ministries. This system can be traced back to the federative structure of the government ministries in 1948 (Kfir, 2002). As of 2011, there are 28 government ministries whose numbers and boundaries are frequently changing due to coalitional considerations. A few of them employ less than 15 civil servants.

These government ministries house 29 subsidiary units, not including the 22 government hospitals. Subsidiary units include, for example, the central Bureau of Statistics in the Office of the Prime Minister, the Meteorological Service in the Transportation Ministry, and the Veterinary Services and Animal Health at the Ministry of Agriculture. There is no clear definition of the status or function

of a subsidiary unit. The Civil Service Commissioner has the authority, upon a request from a ministry's director general, to design a unit within a government ministry as a subsidiary unit. Such a designation implies that the unit will be semi-independent in matters of budget, human resources, accounting, legal matters, etc., and its head will usually report directly to the minister. Governmental hospitals are special subsidiary units within the Ministry of Health and enjoy even greater administrative autonomy. The Civil Service Commissioner can extend or restrict the authorities of a subsidiary unit at any time on the recommendation of the ministry's director general or with his or her approval, or terminate its status as a subsidiary unit upon the request of a ministry's director general or with his or her approval.

By the end of December 2009, there were 56,993 employees in the government ministries and subsidiary units, up from 53,503 in 2004 (Civil Service Commission, 2005; Berger and Shachar-Rosenfeld 2010; Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010).² Focusing on the three highest grades of government ministries and subsidiary units, there were 350 employees in the highest grade, 649 in the second highest grade, and 1340 in the third highest grade (Berger and Shachar-Rosenfeld 2010, 25). This is also the place to note that the screening and examination of candidates for senior positions, for which the Civil Service Commission is responsible, are vulnerable to external (read: political) pressures (State Comptroller, 2004; 2006; 2007). The fact that the civil service is not mentioned in Israel's Basic Laws, and that laws relevant to the civil service are not strictly enforced, extends politicians' room for maneuverability in this regard.

The Legal Framework

Theoretically, the trickling down of political norms of behavior into public management is supposed to be limited by a series of legal barriers. Article 32 of *Basic Law: The Government* (2001) determines that the government must act solely and exclusively within the framework of the powers set by law.

The *Administrative Procedures Amendment (Decision and Reasoning) (1958)* also determines that any governmental organization must act in accordance with its powers as defined by law. All decisions by the government and its bureaucracy are therefore subject to judicial review, meaning that the court can force any government agency to comply with the law if it exceeds its powers without due cause. Hiring and promotion of civil service employees on the basis of a merit system, public tenders and impartial examinations are regulated by the *Civil Service (Appointment) Law (1959)*. The requirement imposed on civil servants to resign if they wish to enter the political arena and compete in an election is specified in the *Civil Service (Curtailed of Partisan Activity and Fundraising) Law (1959)* and disciplinary procedures and sanctions are laid down in the *Civil Service (Discipline) Law (1963)*. Entitlement to state pension and its regulation is set in the *Civil Service (Pension) Law (1970)*. Regulations and directives regarding the rights and obligations of civil servants, collective agreements about wage and other employment conditions are laid down in the *Civil Service Regulations (Personal Code)*. The Civil Service Commission, which is in charge of enforcing the aforementioned laws, is an autonomous subsidiary unit in the Prime Minister Office. Its head, the Civil Service Commissioner, is appointed by the Prime Minister with the approval of the government, and has independent powers guaranteed by law over appointments, discipline, pensions and so on. Overall, these “laws do not reflect a clear and consistent concept about the nature and desirable patterns of public management. Instead, they present the broad range of problems that have arisen over the years for which *ad hoc* legislation has sought solutions” (Galnoor, 2011, p. 41, *italics in original*).

Patterns of Behavior and Administrative Culture

According to Galnoor (2011, 45-48), there are four patterns of behavior of the Israeli civil service. These patterns includes: (i) *centralization* in the relationships between central government and citizens, central government and local authorities, and “strong” ministries (e.g., Defense, Finance and Justice)

and the other ministries; (ii) *pragmatism*, which devalues any notion of planning because of a fatalist presumption that the unexpected will most likely occur, and its derived by-product of *improvisation*, meaning “an extemporaneous action undertaken to cope with a problem or seize an opportunity” (Sharkansky & Zalmanovitch, 2000, p. 321); (iii) *organizational territoriality*, and (iv) *secrecy*, or more specifically, “compartmentalization of secrets between government ministries and sometimes between units within the same ministry” (Galnoor, 2011, p. 47). Not surprisingly, turf battles and inter-organizational rivalries are common and policy coordination for cross-cutting issues is rare. Regarding administrative culture, political appointments are prevalent (Galnoor, 2011), corruption by high-level civil servants is rare (although in recent years there have been some highly-visible cases like, for example, at the Tax Authority and the Ministry of Interior), a bond between the wealthy and senior civil servants has been recorded in numerous instances, and a relaxed public attitude towards corruption is common.

The Changing Role of the State

The changing role of the state is evident in Israel by the decreasing proportion of the public sector in the GDP: from 70.5 percent in 1980 to 54.8 in 1990, 46.9 in 2000 and 42.7 in 2009 (Bank of Israel, 2010). The most significant, comprehensive, and consistent change in Israeli public management is rooted in the process of privatization that has been carried out in practice since the 1980s. The process includes both transparent privatization decisions, and secret administrative decisions regarding budget cuts and reducing the supply of public services and goods (Paz-Fuchs and Kohavi, 2011). Additionally, it spans all government offices and policy areas, and takes place regardless of political changes or the identity of the Prime Minister and the minister in charge. Parallel to the process of privatization, outsourcing is taking place, encompassing two phenomena: First, entire fields are transferred from the state to subcontractors (for example, cleaning, computing, security). Second, manpower contractors

supply workers and government units employ their services only as long as they are required (Paz-Fuchs and Kohavi, 2011; Meron, 2011). This process occurs without thorough public debate with regards to its consequences for a young democracy still striving to build its foundations in various domains, and without an orderly procedure to examine the profitability of privatization in each individual area (Paz-Fuchs and Kohavi, 2011). The privatization touches upon matters of internal and external security, among others, while the outsourcing relates to areas of welfare and social security, among others. A central feature of these processes is weakness in supervision, both in terms of resources and expertise, and a lack of commitment by policymakers to deal with this weakness (Paz-Fuchs and Kohavi 2011).

Bureaucratic Representation

A convenient starting point is a 1995 amendment to Article 15A of the *Civil Service (Appointment) Law (1959)*, which laid down the principle of affirmative action in the civil service. This principle reads as follows: “Among employees of the civil service, expression shall be given, taking the circumstances into consideration, to the appropriate representation of members of both genders.” In subsequent amendments, Article 15A was expanded as follows: “Among employees of the Civil Service at all grades and professions, in every ministry and subsidiary unit, expression shall be given, taking the circumstances into consideration, to the appropriate representation of members of both genders, people with disabilities, Arab members of the population, including Druz, Circassians, and anyone who was, or whose parents were, born in Ethiopia” (quoted from Galnoor, 2011, pp. 79, 169). In 1996, the Unit for the Advancement and Integration of Women in the Civil Service Commission was formed by the Civil Service Commissioner (Shaked, 2004). An in depth analysis of its structure and operation can be found elsewhere (Maor, 2001; Shaked, 2004)

Gender Equity

Since the 1980s, there have been more women than men in the Civil Service — 62% during 1997-1998, 63% during 1999-2000, 64% during 2001-2003, and 65% during 2004-2009 (Shachar-Rosenfeld and Berger, 2010, p. 26; figures do not include employees at the Ministry of Defense). Although some improvement is noticeable in recent years, Table 1 clearly indicates that the higher the rank, the fewer the women. Perhaps most important is that in 2002, women filled 38% of the positions in the civil service in the highest rank — defined as grade 46 in the humanities and social sciences professional ranking and its equivalent ranks in the remaining 17 specialized fields. This figure has increased to 60% in 2006 and remained stable until 2009. A similar, albeit less dramatic trend has been recorded in the second highest grade, with 44% of women filling positions at this grade in 2002, rising to 49% in 2005 and 2007, and reaching 50% in 2009. The question that has arisen is whether women are being appointed to token positions to fulfill affirmative action goals (Dolan, 2004). Table 2 presents the number of women whose working conditions are stipulated in personal contracts — commonly known as Senior Contracts. At face value, an increase in the number of women is recorded, from 27% in 2002 to 30% in 2009. However, if one excludes registrars who have no influence over policy, the share of women ranges between 23% in 2002 and 28% in 2009. Putting these figures in perspective, in 2009 women constituted 17.5% of members of the 18th Knesset (21 of 120 members), 28.5% of the Supreme Court (4 of 14 judges; 2011 figures), 65% of the civil service at large, 60% of the highest rank of the civil service, and only 28% in positions that afford opportunities to influence governmental decision-making. Women at large, and executive-level women in particular, have undoubtedly benefited from the equal employment opportunity provisions of the 1995 amendment to Article 15A of the *Civil Service (Appointment) Law (1959)* and its subsequent modifications. However, more needs to be done to ensure that female advancement into positions of power and influence takes place.

Arab Citizens of Israel, Druze and Circassians

Arabs, Druze and Circassians ((hereafter referred to simply as Arabs) comprise about 20.5% of the Israeli population,³ and yet, in 2010, less than 8% of civil servant positions were filled by this sector of society (Table 3). In 2010, 4717 Arabs were employed in the Israeli governmental offices and subsidiary units, 2941 men and 1776 women. To enter the civil service, Arabs can compete in tenders open solely to the Arab population or in general tenders open to all segments of Israeli society. The share of tenders open solely for the Arab population out of all tenders available rose from 4.5% (36 of a total of 805) in 2005 to 15.4% (182 of 1366) in 2008, and then dropped back down to 9.4% (145 of 1546) in 2010 (Civil Service Commission, 2010).

The very few Arabs employed in the Israeli civil service enter at the lowest levels, and are distributed across the following professional rankings: 1518 (32%) in the specialized field of nursing, 849 (18%) in the administrative rankings, which include low level technical employees and clerks, 518 (11%) in the ranking of doctors, 302 (6.4%) as Imams (i.e., worship leaders of mosques), 231 (4.8%) in the professional ranking of social sciences and humanities, 172 (3.6%) employed as social workers, and the rest in other rankings (Civil Service Commission, 2010, p. 25). Another finding that comes out of the data is that Arab civil servants are employed in positions that require knowledge of Arabic. The defining characteristics of these positions are that they are geographically centered in the north of Israel and that they are positions that cater almost exclusively to Arab society. According to the 2010 data, 1628 (34.5%) are employed in the Northern District, 1195 (25.3%) in the Haifa District, 416 (8.8%) in the Jerusalem District, and the rest in other regions (Civil Service Commission, 2010, p. 15). Regarding the upper ranks, only 38 Arabs were at the highest senior grade of the civil service (i.e., professional as well as administrative rankings) in 2010 (Civil Service Commission, 2010, p. 27).

The fact that many of the positions held by Arab civil servants are in the administrative ranking, and therefore do not require academic knowledge, does not mean that these employees do not possess

academic knowledge. In fact, 52.5% of all Arab civil servants have an academic degree, an increase of 3% since 2008 (Civil Service Commission, 2008; 2010, p. 10).

Israelis of Ethiopian Descent

In 2010, the community of Israelis of Ethiopian descent constituted just under 2% of the general population (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010). The number of Israelis of Ethiopian descent employed by the civil service stood at 1.09% in 2007, and showed a slight increase to 1.2% in 2008 and 1.31% in 2010 (Civil Service Commission, 2011). Regarding their distribution according to rankings, of the 841 citizens of Ethiopian descent employed by the civil service in 2010, 518 are at the administrative rankings, 146 at the nurses' professional ranking, 49 as academics in the humanities and social sciences, and the remaining at all other rankings. Most of these civil servants work at the Ministry of Welfare and Social Services, the Immigration and Border Control Authority, and the Tax Authority. Of those employed in the civil service in 2010, over 13% have elementary education, over 35% have secondary education and 19% have academic education (Civil Service Commission, 2011).

Organizational Obstacles and Personal Barriers

At first glance, Israel is seemingly one of the most progressive societies in regards to minority rights and representation. Women have always had the right to vote in Israel, women serve beside men in the military, and early legislation was already protecting women's rights in the workplace. When one begins to scratch the surface, however, a more complicated picture appears. The military, for example, while it accepts women, does not recruit Arabs and exempts any female who declares herself religious. Furthermore, within the army, the rank of combat soldier was closed to females until a few years ago. Family law is under the sole jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Courts, and religious political parties, which hold enormous power as pivotal parties in Israeli coalition governments, refuse to loosen the grip of

those Rabbinical Courts, making civil marriage and divorce unattainable in Israel, and leaving women vulnerable to their husbands' and the rulings of all-male courts (Golan, 2011).

Despite a plethora of legislation and high court rulings on matters of gender, ethnic, and national equality, Israel still encounters problems with under-represented minorities in the workforce and discriminatory hiring and general workplace practices. With regard to the Arab citizens of Israel, the Orr Commission investigation (2003), which followed the killing of 13 Arab citizens by Israeli police during the political riots in 2000, has determined that there is a discrimination against this group. The data clearly indicates that this is still the case. According to Galnoor (2011, p. 81), “The Discrimination is collective — Arabs work in the civil service in small numbers because they are Arab, not because they lack qualifications (thousands of Arab university graduates are employed), or because they pose a security risk [...]”. On top of that, the representation of all minority groups in the civil service is undermined by decision maker's flaunting and bypassing of the laws. Let me elaborate on this point:

According to the *Civil Service (Appointments) Law (1959)*, tenders are to be used to fill positions and, when confronted with two qualified individuals, the one from an under-represented minority is to be chosen for the job. However, there is a list of positions that are exempt from tender. The “Exemption List” includes, for example, directors general, senior positions in the Prime Minister Office and the Finance Ministry, the Cabinet Secretary, and others. Since 2002, contenders for other positions that are exempted from tenders must appear before a Candidate Search Committee. As for the remaining senior positions, the law is circumvented all too often by appointing a civil servant to the job in an acting capacity (e.g., acting director, acting manager), or as a temporary appointment or replacement. Once a tender is undertaken in order to make a permanent appointment, the acting, temporary or replacement civil servant has of course an advantage over all other candidates as he or she has already been trained for the position in question and will need no further transition period (Maor

2001; Tirosh, 2009). In fact, out of all of the tenders issued between 2002 and 2004, 55% of those positions were filled by people who had worked at that job or a similar job for an average of 21 months before the tender. In the Ministry of Justice the percentage was 66%, and in the Treasury Department it rose as high as 88% (Tirosh, 2009, p. 715). Another way in which hiring tactics are skewed is by issuing tenders that are specifically biased towards a preferred candidate (Maor, 2001; Tirosh, 2009).

According to Tirosh (2009), when positions are filled through an appointment process, as opposed to a public tender, there are two adverse results. First, the immediate position is far more likely to be filled by someone of the hegemony, which directly harms under-represented minorities despite their qualifications. This is because people tend to hire those most similar to them and those they are familiar with. Under-represented minorities are less likely to be within the network of people who come in contact with the person hiring, thus unable to make themselves familiar and prove their qualifications. Second, since many of the tenders are internal and inter-departmental tenders, based on the wrong assumption that the original hiring process was fair and representative, under-represented minorities are again harmed by not being eligible to apply for those tenders (Tirosh, 2009). Moreover, these tenders often only have one applicant, and office norms dictate that it is “rude” to apply for a position that was not tailored for you (Tirosh, 2009, p. 717).

Furthermore, the tenders that are issued do not always follow the guidelines of proper tenders. The reviewers are not anonymous, which means that they can be swayed by friends and co-workers to accept someone familiar and from within the office (Tirosh, 2009). Often, no written test is administered to the candidates, thereby making it difficult to properly assess two candidates in comparison with each other. In many cases there is no written protocol for the reviewers’ decision making process, nor is there any explanation for the final decision (Tirosh, 2009). In addition, an important aspect of the *Civil Service (Appointments) Law (1959)* is the text reading “as much as possible under the circumstances”. This short addition effectively renders any law impotent of real

meaning. It provides a clear loophole for anyone not wishing to comply with the law (Maor, 2001; Shaked, 2004). Consequently, the current hiring practices in the Civil Service Commission effectively shut out under-represented minorities from many professional and senior level positions (Tirosh, 2009).

Concluding Remarks

This analysis yields several conclusions. First, bureaucratic representation varies across gender and other minority groups, with significant advances made with regard to women. However, there is still a need to recruit and promote Israelis of Ethiopian Descent to medium and senior positions, and to undertake a persistent and targeted effort to bring into the civil service highly qualified Israeli Arabs and ensure their equal representation at all rankings and grades. Women and minority groups must be placed into positions for which they are qualified, rather than to satisfy political demands for a diverse workforce. Second, policy makers must ensure that executive-level women continue to benefit from equal-opportunity provisions, and that gains will be noticeable within the upper ranks, especially where they can influence policy in ways that bestow rewards upon their social groups.

Table 1:
The Representation of Women in the Civil Service According to Rank, 2002-2009*

Rank	2002		2003		2004		2005	
	Total**	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women
1	555	38%	556	40%	571	41%	307	57%
2	586	44%	566	47%	558	48%	606	49%
3	950	35%	970	36%	977	37%	1,239	33%
4	2,754	44%	2,776	43%	2,823	44%	3,015	45%
5	4,113	47%	4,251	47%	4,317	47%	4,444	48%
6	4,692	52%	4,648	53%	4,584	54%	4,661	55%
7	5,905	62%	6,026	63%	6,144	64%	6,267	66%
8 and below	29,954	72%	30,589	73%	31,242	72%	30,835	73%
Total	49,509	31,550 (64%)	50,382	32,443 (64%)	51,216	33,051 (65%)	51,374	33,466 (65%)

Rank	2006		2007		2008		2009	
	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women
1	311	60%	331	60%	344	60%	350	60%
2	558	48%	600	49%	625	48%	649	50%
3	1,160	35%	1,163	35%	1,264	37%	1,340	38%
4	2,907	47%	2,950	47%	3,082	48%	3,228	49%
5	4,373	48%	4,461	48%	4,615	49%	4,840	49%
6	4,969	56%	5,641	59%	5,615	60%	5,973	61%
7	6,546	65%	6,577	66%	7,287	67%	8,206	68%
8 and below	31,147	72%	30,252	72%	30,237	72%	30,238	71%
Total	51,971	33,797 (65%)	51,975	33,980 (65%)	53,069	17,995 (65%)	54,824	35,755 (65%)

Sources: Shachar-Rosenfeld and Berger (2007; 2008; 2009; 2010); Civil Service Commission (2005).

* The data displayed above is according to grades across different rankings that do not necessarily reflect seniority and organizational hierarchy. Only government offices with over 50 employees were included in the data presented here. Employees at the Ministry of Defense are excluded.

** "Total" refers to men and women.

Table 2:
Women Employed under Senior Contracts, Divided by Types of Contracts, 2002-2009

Type of Contract	2002		2003		2004		2005	
	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women
Registrars	78	41 (53%)	82	41 (50%)	79	42 (53%)	80	45 (56%)
Senior Contracts	146	25 (17%)	135	22 (16%)	124	21 (17%)	478	121 (26%)
Deputy Minister	3	0	5	0	2	0	2	0
Legal Advisers	32	15 (47%)	34	15 (44%)	34	16 (47%)	37	20 (54%)
Senior Contract (New)	301	78 (26%)	320	78 (24%)	334	89 (28%)	-	-
CEOs (New)	35	2 (6%)	38	5 (13%)	37	5 (15%)	44	7 (16%)
Total	595	161 (27%)	614	161 (26%)	610	176 (29%)	641	193 (30%)

Type of Contract	2006		2007		2008		2009	
	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women
Registrars	87	52 (60%)	80	46 (58%)	85	48 (56%)	92	53 (58%)
Senior Contracts	481	119 (25%)	482	125 (26%)	495	130 (26%)	541	151 (28%)
Deputy Ministers	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
Legal Advisers	39	19 (49%)	40	20 (50%)	39	16 (41%)	40	16 (40%)
Senior Contracts (New)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CEOs (New)	44	7 (16%)	43	7 (16%)	47	8 (17%)	47	6 (13%)
Total	652	197 (30%)	646	198 (31%)	667	202 (30%)	721	226 (30%)

Source: Berger and Shaked (2004); Civil Service Commission (2005; 2006); (Shachar-Rosenfeld and Berger (2010)

Table 3:
Arab Citizens Employed in the Israeli Civil Service Commission

Year	Men	Women	Total Arab Employees	Percentage of Civil Servants
1992	n.a.	n.a.	1117	2.1
1993	n.a.	n.a.	1369	2.5
1994	n.a.	n.a.	1679	3.0
1995	n.a.	n.a.	1997	3.5
1996	n.a.	n.a.	2231	4.0
1997	n.a.	n.a.	2340	4.1
1998	n.a.	n.a.	2537	4.4
1999	n.a.	n.a.	n.a	n.a.
2000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2001	n.a.	n.a.	3176	5.7
2002	n.a.	n.a.	3440	6.1
2003	n.a.	n.a.	2798	5.6
2004	n.a.	n.a.	3154	5.5
2005	2123	1128	3251	5.7
2006	2215	1174	3389	5.9
2007	2312	1265	3577	6.2
2008	2452	1431	3883	6.7
2009	2650	1595	4245	7.0
2010	2914	1776	4717	7.5

Sources: Haidar (2005); Civil Service Commission (2010).

Table 4:

Distribution of Civil Servants of Ethiopian Descent:

Year	Civil Servants of Ethiopian Descent			Total Number of Civil Servants	Percentage of Civil Servants of Ethiopian descent
	Men	Women	Total		
2007	292	337	629	57,946	1.09
2008	330	386	716	59,505	1.2
2009	372	410	782	61,338*	1.27
2010	388	453	841	64,062**	1.31

* Data is correct for 15/6/2010

** Data is correct for 11/2/2011

Source: Civil Service Commission (2011).

References

- Bank of Israel, (2010). *Bank of Israel Report for 2009*, Jerusalem (Hebrew).
- Berger, Y. and Shaked, R. (2004) *Activity Report*, Division for the Advancement and Integration of Women, Jerusalem: Civil Service Commission (Hebrew).
- Central Bureau of Statistics (2010). *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, Jerusalem, Section 10.12 (Hebrew).
- Central Bureau of Statistics (2011). *Press Release*, 8.5.2011, Jerusalem (Hebrew).
- Civil Service Commission (2005). *Appropriate Representation and the State of Women Advancement in the Civil Service*, Document Submitted to the Knesset's Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Jerusalem (Hebrew).
- Civil Service Commission. *Appropriate Representation of Israelis of Ethiopian Descent in the Civil Service: Annual Report*, Various Years, Jerusalem (Hebrew).
- Civil Service Commission, *Appropriate Representation of Arabs Citizens of Israel, Druze and Circassians in the Civil Service: Annual Report*, Various Years, Jerusalem (Hebrew).
- Dolan, J. (2004). Gender Equity: Illusion or Reality for Women in the Federal Executive Service?, *Public Administration Review* 64(3): 299-308.
- Dror, Y. (2002). Forward. In M. Maor (Ed.), *Developments in Israeli Public Administration*. London: Fran Cass, pp. vii.
- Galnoor, I. (2011). *Public Management in Israel: Development, Structure, Functions and Reforms*. London: Routledge.
- Golan, G. (2011). Women and Political Reform in Israel. In F. Sadiqi & M. Ennaji (Ed.), *Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Agents of Change*, London: Routledge.
- Haidar, A. (2005). The Representation of Arab Citizens in the Civil Service, Government Corporations and Local Government, *The Sikkuy Report 2004-5*. www.sikkuy.org.il/english/2005/ali_haidar05.pdf.
- Kfir, A. (2002). The Development of the Israeli Government Offices. In M. Maor (Ed.), *Developments in Israeli Public Administration*. London: Fran Cass, pp. 2-24.
- Israel (1989). *Report of the Professional Public Committee for Comprehensive Examination of the Civil Service and Entities Supported by the State Budget* ("the Kubersky Commission"), Jerusalem (Hebrew).
- Maor, M. (1997) 'The Impact of European Integration and NPM on Recruitment and Training of Senior Public Officials: A Methodology', *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, 7(1): 59-81.
- Maor, M. (1999a) 'The Paradox of Managerialism', *Public Administration Review*, 59(1): 5-18 (Lead Article).

- Maor, M. (1999b) 'Recruitment and Training of Senior Civil Servants in Denmark and Norway, 1970-1995: The Impact of New Public Management and European Integration', *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, 8(4): 321-340.
- Maor, M. (1999c) 'Recruitment and Training of Senior Civil Servants in Germany and the UK, 1970-1995: The Impact of New Public Management and European Integration', *Current Politics and Economics of Europe*, 8(4): 341-355.
- Maor, M. (2001). The Advancement of Women in the Israeli Civil Service: The Gender Equity Policy Approach. *Social Security*, 61, 127-153 (Hebrew).
- Maor, M. and Jones, G.W. (1998) 'Varieties of Administrative Convergence', *International Journal of Public Sector Management* 12(1): 49-62.
- Maor, M. and Stevens, H. (1997) 'The Impact of New Public Management and European Integration on Recruitment and Training in the UK Civil Service, 1970-1995', *Public Administration*, 75(3): 531-551.
- Meron, A. (2011). *Privatization Processes and Trends in the Israeli Social Services*, Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (Hebrew).
- Paz-Fuchs, A. and Kohavi, Z. (2011). *On the Seam between the Public and the Private: Privatization and Nationalization in Israel Annual Report 2010*, Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute (Hebrew).
- Shachar-Rosenfeld, T. and Berger Y. *Activity Report*, Various Years, Division for the Advancement and Integration of Women, Jerusalem: Civil Service Commission (Hebrew).
- Shaked, R. (2004). The Application of Affirmative Action Law in the Civil Service Commission. In A. Maor (Ed.), *Affirmative Action and Equal Representation in Israel*. Tel Aviv: Ramot Press
- Sharkansky, I. and Zalmanovitch, Y. (2000). Improvisation in Public Administration and Policy Making in Israel, *Public Administration Review* 60: 321-9.
- State Comptroller. (2004). *Report on Political Appointments and Inappropriate Appointments at the Ministry of Environment*, Jerusalem: State Comptroller, August (Hebrew).
- State Comptroller. (2006). *Report on the Small and Medium Businesses Authority – Political Appointments*, Jerusalem: State Comptroller, August (Hebrew).
- State Comptroller. (2007). *Annual Report*, Jerusalem: State Comptroller (Hebrew).
- Tirosh, Y. (2009). Fair Representation in Israeli Law – A Realistic Summary. In A. Barak, Y. Zamir, & Y Marzel (Ed.), *Mishael Cheshin Book*. Mishpatim, p. 699-741.

¹ Other countries, however, have experienced wide ranging reforms insofar as recruitment and training of senior civil servants are concerned. See, for example, Maor (1997; 1999a, 1999b, 1999c), Maor and Stevens (1997), and Maor and Jones (1998).

² These numbers were calculated as follows: overall number of employees (not included the Ministry of Defense) — drawn from the Civil Service Commission reports (2004, 2009) — combined with the number of employees at the Ministry of Defense — drawn from the Central Bureau of Statistics (2010). These figures do not include temporary and special contract employees as well as subcontracted employees.

³ As of December 2010, the Israeli population is comprised of 1,587,000 (20.5%) Arab citizens out of a total of 7,746,000 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011).